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INTRODUCTION 
Terrie Hillig worked at the Defense Finance Accounting Service 
(DFAS) for five years, during which time she filed two Title VII 
racial discrimination complaints.1 The complaints were settled under 
terms that required DFAS to “upgrade [her] performance appraisal, 
expunge negative information from her personnel file, and 
retroactively promote her.”2 After the settlement, Hillig applied for a 
position at the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and was told by her 
interviewer that she would be “a perfect fit for the position.”3 Despite 
this praise, Hillig did not receive the job. After she was rejected, 
Hillig discovered that one of her supervisors gave “very strong 
negative feedback” to the DOJ and that this information may have 
disqualified her for the job.4 Hillig’s supervisor “admitted 
characterizing Hillig as a ‘shitty employee’ . . . .”5 After being rejected 
for the DOJ position, Hillig filed suit for retaliation.6 
Negative references are something employers are increasingly 
nervous about because of uncertainty as to what liability exposure 
they incur when giving a reference.7 One human resources expert 
 
Copyright © 2005 by Sarah Carrington Walker Bake r. 
 1. Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 1029 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 1030 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Some employers will not give references at all for fear of liability; according to a survey 
by the Society for Human Resource Management, one in five employers refuses to do so. 
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explains that “[t]he ‘silence is golden’ approach to providing 
references has definitely triumphed over an ‘available on request’ 
philosophy. Why? Because litigation anxiety is alive and well in the 
reference checking arena.”8 Getting references is increasingly 
desirable, both because employers wish to hire the best possible 
employees and because they are attuned to potential security risks; 
failing to get adequate references exposes employers to the possibility 
of lawsuits for negligent hiring.9 Yet employers’ desire to get accurate 
references clashes with a countervailing trend: a swift increase in the 
number of retaliation claims against employers for negative 
references.10 Retaliation cases over negative references involve claims 
that the negative reference was motivated by a desire to “get back” at 
the employee for engaging in protected activity under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).11 A negative reference, although 
perhaps less dramatic than termination, can be just as devastating to 
an employee’s career in that it extends beyond the current 
employment relationship to taint a potential future one. 
Both the importance of the reference issue to employers and the 
potentially devastating consequences of negative references for 
employees resonate in the Tenth Circuit’s recent opinion of Hillig v. 
Rumsfeld.12 In Hillig, as in other Title VII retaliation and 
discrimination cases, the court applied the McDonnell Douglas 
framework13 for burden shifting which, as a threshold matter, requires 
that the employee prove a prima facie case of retaliation.14 To 
 
Carolyn Hirschman, The Whole Truth, HR MAGAZINE, June 2000, at 86, 86–87. For a 
thoughtful discussion of the ethical and legal implications of reference giving, see Ellen 
Harshman & Denise R. Chachere, Employee References: Between the Legal Devil and the 
Ethical Deep Blue Sea, 23 J. BUS. ETHICS 29, 34–38 (2000). 
 8. WENDY BLISS, LEGAL, EFFECTIVE REFERENCES: HOW TO GIVE AND GET THEM 7 
(2001). 
 9. Id. at 22–24; see also Mark J. Dorris & Brian H. Kleiner, New Developments 
Concerning Negligent Hiring in Public Schools, MGMT. RES. NEWS, Feb. 2003, at 155, 159 
(analyzing how to prevent liability by checking references before hiring). In addition to avoiding 
litigation, reference checking assures an employer that the applicant is who he says he is: 
“[A]bout 30 percent of all job applicants make material misrepresentations on resumes . . . .” 
Pamela Babcock, Spotting Lies, HR MAGAZINE, Oct. 2003, at  46, 47. 
 10. See Robin E. Shea, Break the Retaliation Cycle, HR MAGAZINE, July 2002, at 89, 89 
(“More than 27 percent of all charges filed with the EEOC in 2001 were retaliation charges.”). 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). 
 12. 381 F.3d 1028 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 13. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greene, 411 U.S. 792, 800–07 (1973) (identifying the 
system of burden shifting for Title VII disparate treatment claims). 
 14. Id. at 1030–31. 
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establish a prima facie case, the employee must show that the 
employer has taken an “adverse employment action” against her.15 
Although such employer actions as terminations and demotions fall 
clearly into this category, the requirement is defined differently 
among the circuits, and some types of employer action, including 
negative references, have proven very difficult to categorize.16 In 
Hillig, the Tenth Circuit found that a negative reference constituted 
an adverse employment action even though there was no proof that 
the employee would have received the job if the reference had not 
been given.17 This holding sparked debate both within the media and 
among academics about whether the Tenth Circuit’s standard for 
defining an adverse employment action exposes employers to 
unnecessary liability.18 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Hillig aroused controversy not 
only because it seemed to leave employers too vulnerable to 
retaliation suits, but also because it highlighted the divide among the 
circuits as to what exactly constitutes an adverse employment action 
in Title VII retaliation claims. The circuits disagree as to whether an 
employee must show she would have received the prospective job but 
for the negative reference.19 They generally follow either the 
“narrow” or “broad” rules for determining what constitutes an 
adverse action.20 Circuits that apply the “narrow” or “conservative” 
standard require that an employee who receives a negative reference 
prove that she would have gotten the prospective job if not for that 
reference, whereas circuits applying the “broad” or “liberal” standard 
apply a more holistic test and do not require such “but for” 
evidence.21 
 
 15. See infra Part I.A for a detailed explanation of the prima facie case and McDonnell 
Douglas framework. 
 16. See Matthew J. Wiles, Comment, Defining Adverse Employment Action in Title VII 
Claims for Employer Retaliation: Determining the Most Appropriate Standard, 27 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 217, 223–241 (2001) (discussing the difficulty of categorizing certain employment actions 
and the standards that should be used to do so). 
 17. Hillig , 381 F.3d at 1031–33. 
 18. See Maria Greco Danaher, Negative References Can Be ‘Adverse Action,’ HR 
MAGAZINE, Nov. 2004, at 131, 131 (discussing Hillig v. Rumsfeld); Patrick F. Dorrian, Negative 
Reference Proved Retaliation Claim of Defense Employee, Tenth Circuit Rules, LEADING THE 
NEWS, THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., Sept. 2, 2004, AA-1 (same). 
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See infra Part II.A. Some scholars have divided the circuits into three camps: narrow, 
intermediate, and broad. See Melissa A. Essary & Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims 
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Although there has been thoughtful discussion about how the 
adverse employment action requirement should generally be defined, 
neither the Supreme Court nor scholars have addressed the more 
specific issue of employer liability in retaliation claims for providing a 
negative reference.22 Although other types of employer actions have 
also proved difficult to classify consistently in adverse employment 
action determinations, this Note refrains from analyzing these other 
actions in favor of closely examining the important issue of employer 
references.23 References are a particularly important issue for both 
employers and employees in this increasingly security-conscious 
world; in addition to traditional concerns over hiring competent 
people, employers now worry about the safety of employees and 
customers.24 Despite the acute need for employer references that go 
beyond the “name, rank, and serial number” approach taken by so 
many employers,25 the current confusion in the law has created an 
environment in which employers are more reluctant than ever to 
provide references for fear of litigation. Not only are references an 
issue of great import for employers, but as allegations in negative 
reference retaliation cases range from the most frivolous26 to the very 
 
Under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers, 
Unresolved Courts, 63 MO. L. REV. 115, 134–40 (1998). Professors Essary and Friedman identify 
the Second and Third Circuits as falling into the intermediate camp, but this Note will show 
that, using references as a point of analysis, the Second Circuit follows the narrow rule and the 
Third Circuit follows the broad rule. See id.; infra  Part II. This Note argues that the First, Third, 
Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits all follow the broad rule. See infra  note 69. The Second and 
Eleventh Circuits follow the narrow rule. See infra  note 61; see also Wendy Hyland, Note, Equal 
Opportunity for Employers: Elevating the Adverse Employment Action Standard to Allow Only 
Meritorious Retaliation Claims, 90 KY. L.J. 273, 277–83 (2001) (dividing the circuits into liberal, 
moderate, and conservative groups). 
 22. The Supreme Court case of Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. held that the term “employee” as 
used in Title VII includes former employees, and thus that retaliation and discrimination suits 
may be brought by former employees. 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997). The Court, however, did not go 
beyond this holding to address the retaliation issue specifically. Id. For an analysis of the impact 
of Shell Oil, see Lucia B. Thompson, Annual Survey of Labor and Employment Law, 39 B.C. L. 
REV. 410, 410–21 (1998).  
 23. Some examples of these other difficult-to-classify potential adverse actions are verbal 
threats of termination, missed pay increases, and reprimands. Wiles, supra note 16, at 223–29. 
 24. See BLISS, supra note 8, at 23 (describing an incident where, after Allstate Insurance 
Company failed to mention concerns about a mentally unstable employee in a recommendation 
to his new employer, Fire man's Fund Insurance Co., the employee killed several employees and 
himself when Fireman's Fund fired him for an unexcused absence).  
 25. Id. at 3–7. 
 26. See, e.g., Brown v. Chicago Transit Auth., 115 Fed. App’x 865, 867 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(finding that the employee failed to produce evidence that her previous employer was even 
contacted by any prospective employers, much less that it gave her a negative reference). 
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serious,27 these cases offer a unique opportunity to consider the 
appropriateness of the broad and narrow rules in general. An analysis 
of negative reference cases, as discussed in Part III, illustrates the 
great danger that the narrow rule poses to employees’ ability to assert 
their rights under Title VII. 
This Note agrees with other scholars that the narrow rule 
inappropriately applies Supreme Court precedent. Unlike previous 
scholarship, however, it also argues that the narrow rule introduces an 
additional and incorrect “but for” causation requirement into the 
prima facie case. This Note addresses for the first time the recent 
Supreme Court case of Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, which 
considered the parameters of the tangible employment action 
requirement in discrimination cases,28 and its likely impact on this 
debate. Further, the uniform adoption of the broad rule is necessary 
to balance the relevant public policy interests such as deterring 
retaliation, promoting responsible recordkeeping by employers, 
information forcing, ensuring that Title VII’s protections remain vital, 
and discouraging frivolous retaliation suits. Finally, this Note argues 
that when the broad rule is analyzed within the context of the entire 
McDonnell Douglas framework, the result is a balanced test that 
takes both employer and employee interests into consideration; 
therefore, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari in a future Title 
VII retaliation case and determine that the broad rule is the correct 
standard for judging adverse employment actions. 
Part I briefly outlines the requirements for making a prima facie 
retaliation case and reviews Supreme Court precedent influencing 
retaliation cases. Part II uses the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Hillig as a 
lens through which to examine the current split in the circuits as to 
the meaning of an adverse employment action. Part III uses the issue 
of negative references to show the particular dangers of the narrow 
rule and both the policy and legal advantages of the broad rule in 
retaliation cases generally. Finally, Part IV addresses the practical 
implications of the broad rule when viewed within the entirety of the 
McDonnell Douglas framework. 
 
 27. See, e.g., Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 1030 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[The employee’s 
supervisor] also admitted characterizing Hillig as a ‘shitty employee.’”). 
 28. 542 U.S. 129 (2004).  
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I.  THE PRIMA FACIE CASE AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
An employee making a Title VII retaliation claim must first 
prove a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework. 
Although there is little Supreme Court precedent on retaliation 
claims specifically, the Court’s standard for a tangible employment 
action29 in the context of discrimination claims has been applied—
improperly—to retaliation claims as part of the narrow rule. The facts 
of Hillig v. Rumsfeld can be applied to this framework to illustrate the 
burden placed upon employees in making such a case. 
A. McDonnell Douglas and the Prima Facie Case 
Like many other federal statutes that regulate the employer-
employee relationship,30 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
relies on an antiretaliation provision to give effect to its prohibition of 
discrimination in the workplace.31 Section 704 of Title VII establishes 
that it is unlawful for an employer to:  
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for 
employment . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice 
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or 
because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing under this subchapter.32 
Without such a provision protecting employees who bring claims 
against their employers, the threat of retaliation could chill potential 
claims and undermine the effectiveness of Title VII. 
As Title  VII does not specify which party bears the burden of 
proof in a retaliation case, courts follow the allocation of burdens 
outlined by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
 
 29. See infra  Part I.C for a discussion of the distinction between the tangible and adverse 
employment action standards. 
 30. See Donna Smith Cude & Brian M. Steger, Does Justice Need Glasses? Unla wful 
Retaliation Under Title VII Following Mattern: Will Courts Know It When They See It? , 14 LAB. 
LAW. 373, 375 n.10 (1998) (identifying several such statutes, including the  Family and Medical 
Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615; the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4); the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3); and the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)); see also Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155, 
159 (2d Cir. 1999) (“It is appropriate to apply the framework used in analyzing retaliation claims 
under Title VII in analyzing a claim of retaliation under the ADA.”).  
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000) [hereinafter “Title VII” ]. 
 32. Id.. 
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Green.33 Even though the Supreme Court created the McDonnell 
Douglas framework for the discrimination context, lower courts have 
adapted and applied it to retaliation cases as well.34 Although the 
Court has not clearly articulated all of the reasoning behind the 
McDonnell Douglas framework, some members of the legal 
community claim that it exists to provide “a significant helping hand 
[to employees], to make sure their prospects are better than they 
would be under the rigors of the ordinary rules of litigation.”35 This 
Note (and much of the retaliation litigation) focuses on the first 
burden in the framework, the employee’s establishment of a prima 
facie case of retaliation.36 The prima facie case has three elements: 
first, that the employee engaged in activity protected by Title VII; 
second, that there is a causal connection between the adverse 
employment action and the protected activity; and third, that the 
employee suffered an adverse employment action.37 If the employee 
successfully makes out a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to 
the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the adverse employment action.38 If the employer succeeds, the 
employee, to maintain a claim, must establish that the employer’s 
reason was merely a pretext.39 
The facts of Hillig v. Rumsfeld can be used to clarify the 
requirements for the prima facie case. Although the Tenth Circuit 
only addressed the adverse employment action requirement in Hillig, 
the next Section will apply each of the requirements to the facts of the 
case to illustrate how an employee might establish a prima facie case 
of retaliation. 
 
 33. See 411 U.S. 792, 800–07 (1973) (identifying the system of burden shifting for Title VII 
disparate treatment claims); see also Cude & Steger, supra note 30, at 375–85 (offering an 
analysis of the history of the framework). 
 34. See Cude & Steger, supra  note 30, at 375 n.16 (listing cases in which the First, Seventh, 
and Eighth Circuits have applied the McDonnell Douglas framework to retaliation cases). 
 35. Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. 
REV. 2229, 2231 (1995). 
 36. See id. at 2276 n.153. 
 37. EEOC v. L.B. Foster Co., 123 F.3d 746, 754 (3d Cir. 1997).  
 38. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
 39. Id. at 804. 
03_BAKER.DOC  2/6/2006   4:02  PM 
160 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:153 
B. The Prima Facie Case as Applied to the Facts of  
Hillig v. Rumsfeld 
To make out a prima facie case, employees must show, first, that 
they were involved with protected activity as it is defined in Title VII. 
Hillig satisfied this requirement because she had filed the sexual 
discrimination suit.40 Lesser involvement than filing suit will suffice as 
well, as the statute defines “protected activity” broadly and includes 
actions such as testifying against employers or simply opposing 
unlawful employment practices.41 This is usually one of the more 
clear-cut requirements.42 
Second, employees must establish a causal link between the 
alleged retaliation and their involvement with the protected activity. 
Proving causation can be difficult, given that the employer must have 
been aware of the protected activity and that there must be a close 
temporal connection between the protected activity and the adverse 
action in question.43 This element is fairly contentious, and the exact 
definition of causation varies among federal courts.44 Although the 
Hillig opinion did not address causation, Hillig would likely satisfy 
this requirement, given that there was a close temporal connection 
between her filing and settling of the discrimination suit and the 
 
 40. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000) (enumerating approved types of participation, 
including having “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII]”).  
 41. See id. Title VII specifies two different categories of protected activity, commonly 
referred to as “participation” and “opposition.” Cude & Steger, supra  note 30, at 378. The 
opposition category has been more difficult for courts to define and varies by circuit. Id. at 379. 
 42. See Cude & Steger, supra note 30, at 378 (“Section 704(a)’s participation clause is 
relatively straightforward.”). 
 43. See id. at 379–80: 
The courts are in agreement that proof of retaliation may be shown by either direct or 
circumstantial evidence. Likewise, the courts agree that, to demonstrate a causal link, 
a employee must show that the person who took the allegedly adverse action was 
aware that the employee had engaged in protected activity. 
The Supreme Court has also declined to weigh in on the issue of causation, only briefly 
discussing the issue in Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272–74 (2001). 
There, the employee failed to show that a reasonable person would have believed that the 
actions against her were discriminatory and so did not make out a successful retaliation case. Id. 
Without deciding the appropriate extent of causation in Title VII retaliation claims, the Court 
considered the temporal proximity requirement and implied that it would allow a showing of 
close temporal proximity to imply causation if it believed that the original activity was 
protected. See id. at 273–74 (citing cases that require “very close” temporal proximity). 
 44. See Cude & Steger, supra note 30, at 380 n. 37 (“Due to [uncertainty over the issue of 
temporal proximity], whether or not a plaintiff can establish a causal connection is often the 
most hotly contested element of a retaliation lawsuit.”). 
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negative reference she received when applying for the DOJ position. 
Moreover, the supervisor who gave the negative reference knew 
about her discrimination claims.45 
Third, employees must show that the employer took an adverse 
employment action against them. This is perhaps the most 
contentious prong of the prima facie case because the law is unsettled. 
The Supreme Court has clearly established, however, that the prima 
facie case is intended to be a fairly low bar, so the adverse action 
requirement should not be so tough as to screen out legitimate 
cases.46 The outcome of Hillig ’s case depends on how the adverse 
action requirement is defined. Part II offers a detailed examination of 
how her fate would change under the different characterizations of 
the adverse employment action requirement. 
C. The Tangible Employment Action 
In the absence of a Supreme Court decision clarifying the 
requirements for the prima facie case for retaliation, lower courts 
have looked to the Court’s seminal discrimination cases of Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth47 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton48 for 
guidance.49 The cases dealt with employer liability for discriminatory 
acts of supervisors under Title VII and held that employers would be 
strictly liable when a supervisor “takes a tangible employment action 
against [a] subordinate.”50 The Court famously defined tangible 
employment action as “a significant change in employment status, 
such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with 
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a 
significant change in benefits.”51 If the employment action fails to 
meet this high standard, the employer may raise an affirmative 
 
 45. Hillig would have had a more difficult time meeting the temporal proximity 
requirement, see supra note 43, but it is unclear whether such temporal proximity is required in 
every case. 
 46. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (“The burden of 
establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.”). 
 47. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).  
 48. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).  
 49. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Parsing the Meaning of “Adverse Employment Action” in 
Title VII Disparate Treatment, Sexual Harassment, and Retaliation Claims: What Should Be 
Actionable Wrongdoing? , 56 OKLA. L. REV. 623, 635 n.24 (citing Evans v. City of Houston, 246 
F.3d 344, 353 (5th Cir. 2001), and Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 255–56 (4th Cir. 1999), as 
examples of cases incorrectly applying Ellerth to retaliation claims). 
 50. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760. 
 51. Id. at 761. 
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defense to liability in the discrimination suit context.52 Although all of 
the circuits follow these cases in the discrimination context,53 some 
courts have inappropriately applied the Ellerth/Faragher definition of 
tangible employment action to the adverse employment action 
requirement in retaliation cases.54 
The distinction between a tangible employment action and an 
adverse employment action may seem merely semantic, but the level 
of employer action required to establish the two types of actions has 
been construed differently by the courts. The Supreme Court clarified 
Ellerth/Faragher most recently in Pennsylvania State Police v. 
Suders,55 explaining that the tang ible employment action requirement 
applies in cases in which the employer will be strictly liable for the 
discrimination; in situations in which there is no tangible employment 
action, the employer may raise an affirmative defense to the claim.56 
Specifically at issue in Suders was whether constructive discharge is a 
tangible employment action under Title VII.57 The Court held that 
whether a constructive discharge was a tangible employment action 
would depend on the circumstance of the individual case; this “case-
by-case”58 rule is likely to confuse the circuits even further as they 
attempt to analogize the Suders holding to retaliation cases. Because 
the Supreme Court has not defined what constitutes an adverse 
employment action for the prima facie case of retaliation, the lower 
courts have constructed their own, often conflicting, definitions.59 
 
 52. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 53. See Hillig  v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 1031 (10th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing the tangible 
employment action standard from the adverse employment action standard used in retaliation 
cases). 
 54. See Margery Corbin Eddy, Finding the Appropriate Standard for Employer Liability in 
Title VII Retaliation Cases: An Examination of the Applicability of Sexual Harassment 
Paradigms, 63 ALB. L. REV. 361, 372–77 (1999) (explaining the historical application of sexual 
harassment law to retaliation cases); see also infra Part III for a discussion of why this 
application of the tangible employment action standard is incorrect. 
 55. 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004). 
 56. Id. at 2347. 
 57. Id. at 2346–47. 
 58. Id. at 2357. 
 59. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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II.  THE DIVISION IN THE CIRCUITS: NARROW VERSUS BROAD 
Hillig v. Rumsfeld60 illustrates particularly well the problem of 
defining an adverse employment action in the context of references. 
Using this case as a framework, this Part analyzes the differences 
between the narrow and broad views of what constitutes an adverse 
employment action, as well as the Supreme Court precedent that 
influences these rules. The narrow rule requires a prospective 
employee to prove that she would have gotten the job if not for the 
negative reference, whereas the broad rule applies a case-by-case 
approach that requires the employee to prove only that the action 
was “materially adverse” to the employee’s job status. 
A. The Narrow Rule 
The narrow rule, in the reference context, requires that the 
employee show she would have received the prospective job were it 
not for the negative reference, or put differently, that the negative 
reference was an action that had an “ultimate” or “tangible” effect on 
the employee’s status. This rule provides an understandably welcome 
bright-line for employers, and versions of this rule have been 
followed by the Fifth, Second, and Eleventh Circuits.61 The Fifth 
Circuit requires an employee to show that the employer took an 
“ultimate employment action” against the employee in order to 
satisfy the prima facie case standard; therefore a negative reference 
will only be an ultimate employment action when it has the effect of 
preventing the employee from getting a job she would have otherwise 
received.62 Actions such as “hiring, granting leave, discharging, 
promoting, and compensating” are also ultimate employment actions, 
and these actions would also be considered tangible employment 
actions under the Supreme Court’s standard.63 
Most of the circuits following the narrow rule refer to a tangible, 
rather than ultimate, employment action, but the effect is the same: 
 
 60. Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 61. See Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(requiring proof that the reference “caused or contributed to the reject by the prospective 
employer”); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding that negative 
reference was insufficient to show retaliation as the record indicated the employee would not 
have been hired even if the reference had not been given). 
 62. See Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708 (following the rule “that Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision refers to ultimate employment decisions”). 
 63. Id. at 707. 
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the employee has a more difficult burden in establishing the prima 
facie case than in a circuit following the broad rule.64 Hillig’s claim 
would not have succeeded in circuits following this rule, as despite the 
evidence of her supervisor’s egregious conduct, she could not show 
definitively that she would have received the DFAS position were it 
not for the reference. If DFAS moved for summary judgment, it 
would have succeeded without having to offer any explanation for the 
supervisor’s egregious conduct. 
B. The Broad Rule 
The Tenth Circuit found that Hillig did not have to prove that 
she would have gotten the position but for the negative reference: 
evidence that the negative reference was given, in light of the facts of 
the case, was enough to satisfy the adverse action requirement.65 
Rather than require a tangible employment action, circuits applying 
the broad rule allow an employee to satisfy the adverse employment 
action requirement if there is evidence that a negative reference was 
given and the overall facts of the case support a finding that the 
“employer’s conduct [was] materially adverse to the employee’s job 
status.”66 According to the Tenth Circuit, a “mere inconvenience”67 or 
de minimis injury will not suffice, and the facts of each case must be 
considered in light of such factors as whether the action “causes 
‘harm to future employment prospects.’”68 The Tenth Circuit is not 
alone in this interpretation: the First, Third, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. 
Circuits all follow a version of this rule.69 
 
 64. Levinson, supra note 49, at 648. 
 65. Id. at 1031–35. 
 66. Id. at 1033 (quoting Wells v. Colo. Dept. of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1213 (10th Cir. 
2003). 
 67. Id. at 1031 (quoting Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986–87 (10th Cir. 1996)). 
 68. Id. This test has been characterized as the broad rule by some scholars and has been 
called a “case-by-case” approach by others. Essary & Friedman, supra  note 21, at 139. 
 69. EEOC v. L.B. Foster Co., 123 F.3d 746, 754 (3d Cir. 1997); Brown v. Chi. Transit Auth., 
115 Fed. App’x 865, 867 (7th Cir. 2004); Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 1997); 
Smith v. Sec’y of the Navy, 659 F.2d 1113, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Hyland, supra note 21, 
at 278–89 (explaining the First Circuit’s version of this rule). Professors Cude and Steger, 
however, argue that most of the circuits follow the narrow rule as elucidated in Mattern v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997). Cude & Steger, supra note 30, at 382–83. 
While the Fifth, Second, and Eleventh Circuits do follow the narrow rule, the professor’s claim 
that the Seventh and Third Circuits follow the rule is incorrect. Although these Circuits have 
struggled with formulating a clear rule, the standard applied is most similar to the broad rule, as 
explained above.   
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For example, in EEOC v. L.B. Foster Co.,70 the Third Circuit 
found the employee had shown an adverse employment action in her 
former employer’s refusal to give a reference, even though there was 
no direct evidence that the refusal caused her rejection from the new 
position to which she had applied.71 The court found that to hold 
otherwise would be to excuse retaliation merely because it was not 
effective: “[a]n employer who retaliates can not [sic] escape liability 
merely because the retaliation falls short of its intended result.”72 This 
statement encapsulates well the spirit of the broad rule.73 
Although the broad rule is somewhat more employee-friendly 
than the narrow rule, it is not an open invitation for frivolous lawsuits. 
Even the Tenth Circuit, which describes its interpretation of adverse 
employment actions as a “liberal definition,” has granted summary 
judgment to many employers when employees have failed to meet the 
requirements of the prima facie case.74 The resulting test, although 
liberal in defining an adverse employment action, still ensures that 
the prima facie case requirement performs its intended function of 
weeding out those cases that are clearly without merit. It is 
unfortunate that the Tenth Circuit’s language that it will “liberally 
define[] the phrase adverse employment action”75 has been taken out 
of context and incorrectly interpreted by critics to mean that it will 
allow nearly any action to qualify.76 
 
 70. 123 F.3d 746 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 71. Id. at 754. 
 72. Id. 
 73. A few scholars have characterized the Third Circuit’s rule as a third type, calling it the 
moderate rule. See Hyland, supra  note 21, at 277–83 (characterizing the circuits as liberal, 
intermediate, and conservative). When L.B. Foster Co. and Hillig are compared, however, it is 
clear that the Third and Tenth Circuits both follow the broad rule. See L.B. Foster Co., 123 F.3d 
at 754 (holding that excusing retaliation merely because it did not cause the employee to lose 
the job would go against the purpose of the statute); Hillig , 381 F.3d at 1033 (“[W]hile we 
require that the ‘e mployer’s conduct [] be materially adverse to the employee’s job status,’ we 
allow an employee to show materiality other than by showing a tangible employment action.” 
(quoting Wells v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1213 (10th Cir. 2003)) (internal citation 
omitted) (alteration in original)). Those same scholars claim that the Se cond Circuit also follows 
this “moderate” rule, but Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 
1999), illustrates that the Second Circuit actually follows the narrow rule; see id. at 160, 
requiring proof that the reference “caused or contributed to the rejection by the prospective 
employer.” 
 74. Hillig , 381 F.3d at 1032. 
 75. Id. (quoting Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Sch., 164 F.3d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1998) (alteration 
in original)). 
 76. See Hyland, supra note 21, at 292 (arguing that the broad rule allows employees to 
bring retaliation suits based on trivial employment actions). 
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III.  ARGUMENTS FOR A BROAD RULE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
REFERENCES 
The broad rule for defining an adverse employment action is the 
best choice from both a legal and a policy standpoint. Legally, the 
narrow rule fails in two major ways: first, it unnecessarily introduces 
an additional “but for” causation element into the prima facie case 
framework; and second, it improperly applies Supreme Court rulings 
on discrimination, resulting in an unfairly restrictive rule. The Court’s 
decision in Suders is likely to complicate this debate. The policy 
arguments in favor of the broad rule are varied and compelling, 
including promoting a level field of power and information between 
the parties, protecting the validity of the original statute, and 
deterrence. 
A. Legal Arguments 
This Note makes three legal arguments against the narrow rule. 
First, the narrow rule inserts an additional “but for” causation 
requirement into the prima facie case that is both unduly harsh and 
inconsistent with precedent. Second, as other scholars have noted, the 
narrow rule inappropriately applies the tangible employment action 
requirement created by the Supreme Court in Ellerth/Faragher. As a 
result, the adverse employment action prong of McDonnell Douglas 
becomes outcome-determinative against the employee. Third, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Suders is likely to muddy the waters 
even further, because it builds on the tangible employment action 
standard set forth in Ellerth/Faragher. Although some of the language 
in Suders could be interpreted to lend credence to the universal 
adoption of a narrower rule, the Court’s holding actually supports the 
broad rule. 
1. Inappropriate Addition of a “But For” Requirement in the 
Prima Facie Case.  When applied in reference cases, the narrow rule 
requires that employees meet an additional “but for” causation 
element to make the prima facie case. The inquiry as to whether a 
negative reference constitutes an adverse employment action under 
the narrow rule focuses improperly on causation rather than on the 
harm or potential harm to the employee. In a case applying the 
narrow rule, for example, the Second Circuit stated: “[w]here . . . 
there is no admissible evidence that the statements of the former 
employer caused or contributed to the rejection by the prospective 
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employer, the employee has failed to present a prima facie case.”77 
Although not worded as such, the result of this test is that Hillig 
would not have been able to prove the prima facie case as she could 
not show she would have gotten the job but for the negative 
reference. Employees have significantly less information about the 
hiring process than do employers, and given the subjective nature of 
the hiring process, it is difficult to state that any one factor would be 
determinative in a decision not to hire a particular applicant. Thus, 
the narrow rule incorporates an additional “but for” test into the 
adverse employment action element of the prima facie case, which 
creates a nearly impossible standard for an employee to meet.78 
There is, of course, a causation element to the prima facie case 
that must be met by all employees. Although the specifics vary by 
jurisdiction, the general rules on the causation requirement are that it 
can be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, there must be a 
proximate link between the protected activity and the alleged 
retaliation, and the person taking the adverse employment action 
must have known about the protected activity.79 The causation 
requirement can be difficult to meet,80 but even narrow-rule courts 
have acknowledged that requiring a “but for” test under the prima 
facie case is inappropriate. In Long v. Eastfield College,81 for example, 
the Fifth Circuit stated: “we do note that a employee need not prove 
that her protected activity was the sole factor motivating the 
employer’s challenged decision in order to establish . . . a prima facie 
case.”82 The court’s analysis in Long was focused on the causation 
aspect of the prima facie case,83 rather than on causation as an aspect 
 
 77. Sarno, 183 F.3d at 160. In Bailey, the employee received an unfavorable reference and 
was rejected for the prospective position: the court approved the district court’s findings that the 
employer “would not have hired Bailey even if the negative reference had not been given.” 850 
F.2d at 1508 . 
 78. See Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 1030–31 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding that employee 
could not prove that she would have gotten the job but for the negative reference). 
 79. Cude & Steger, supra note 30, at 379–80. There is some disagreement as to how 
proximate the adverse action must be to the protected activity, given that the Third Circuit has 
held that “temporal proximity” is often sufficient to prove causation whereas the Eighth Circuit 
has held that temporal proximity is inadequate. Id. at 380 n.37 (citing Feltmann v. Sieben, 108 
F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 1997) and Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
 80. See supra Part I.B. 
 81. 88 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 82. Id. at 305 n.4. 
 83. See id. (finding that “[t]he standard for establishing the ‘causal link’ element of the 
employee’s prima facie case is much less stringent” than the “but for” requirement incorporated 
later in the test).  
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of the adverse employment action requirement, and it is logical that 
the latter element should not contain a stricter causation requirement 
than does the causation element itself. 
If the employee reaches a jury, however, some courts, including 
the Fifth Circuit, the leading proponent of the narrow rule, do 
incorporate a “but for” test into the McDonnell Douglas framework. 
After the employer provides a legitimate purpose for the adverse 
employment action, the Fifth Circuit requires the employee show that 
but for the discriminatory purpose, the adverse employment action 
would not have been taken.84 Even the Fifth Circuit, however, agrees 
that the causation standard for the prima facie case is much lighter 
than the standard imposed on the employee to win before a jury, 
which is indeed a “but for” standard.85 “At this threshold stage, the 
standard for satisfying the causation element is ‘much less stringent’ 
than a ‘but for’ causation standard.”86 
Why does it matter that the narrow rule implements a “but for” 
causation requirement for the adverse-employment-action prong of 
the prima facie case if employees will be forced to meet this burden 
eventually? The prima facie case exists to promote information 
sharing and solve the “problem of proof” that exists for employees 
trying to prove the intangibles of discrimination or retaliation.87 The 
“problem of proof” refers to the difficulty that employees have 
establishing or finding proof of discriminatory intent: providing 
compelling evidence of the mental state and intentions of another is a 
very difficult task. When an employee meets the lighter burden called 
for under the prima facie case, the employer—the party with the 
information about the intentions behind the adverse employment 
action—has an incentive to produce information about those 
intentions to show that the action was not done in retaliation. The 
prima facie case also exists as a screening mechanism to ensure that 
those cases devoid of merit do not take up time in the legal system or 
create undue expense for the employer.88 Employees who are able to 
establish a prima facie case are entitled to judgment in their favor 
 
 84. Pineda v. UPS, 360 F.3d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 85. Fierros v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 191–92 (5th Cir. 2001).  
 86. Id. at 191 (quoting Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 305 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
 87. Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial Proof in Employment Discrimination 
Litigation: St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the “Persona lity” Excuse, 18 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 183, 187–92 (1997). 
 88. See id. at 191 (“A case is highly unlikely to get to trial if the complainant cannot make 
the minimal showing necessary to raise an inference of discrimination . . . .”). 
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unless the employer offers some legitimate reason for the adverse 
employment action.89 Once past the prima facie case stage, the 
employee is also more likely to receive a settlement offer or to be 
able to engage in more extensive discovery to get the proof required 
to actually win before a jury. 
2. The Inappropriate Application of the Tangible Employment 
Action Standard.  The narrow rule also inappropriately follows the 
tangible employment action standard set out by the Supreme Court 
for discrimination cases in Ellerth/Faragher.90 Professor Rosalie 
Berger Levinson reaches this conclusion in her analysis of adverse 
employment actions in the larger context of Title VII retaliation, 
disparate treatment, and sexual harassment claims.91 Although 
Professor Levinson does not examine the specific issue of references 
in retaliation claims, she argues that applying the tangible 
employment action standard to retaliation claims is generally 
inappropriate.92 Perhaps most persuasive is her argument that 
applying discrimination law to retaliation claims is inappropriate 
because Congress intended to create a broader standard for 
retaliation than for discrimination.93 Offering further support for this 
position is the Supreme Court’s opinion in Robinson v. Shell Oil.94 In 
Shell Oil, the Court interpreted Title VII’s use of the term 
“employee” to include former employees and found “a primary 
purpose of antiretaliation provisions” is to promote “unfettered 
access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”95 Of Shell Oil, Professor 
Levinson writes that “[t]he Supreme Court . . . acknowledged the 
 
 89. See id. at 189 (“If the employer fails to articulate . . . a reason, the court must enter 
judgment for the employee.”). 
 90. See supra  Part I.C for a discussion of Ellerth/Faragher and the tangible employment 
action standard. 
 91. Levinson, supra note 49, at 674. Professor Levinson’s analysis offers an excellent and 
detailed analysis of the standard for actionable wrongdoing under Title VII. 
 92. See id. at 648–52 (criticizing the application of discrimination law to retaliation claims). 
For another discussion of the inappropriateness of applying the Ellerth/Faragher standard to 
retaliation claims and the benefits of the “liberal standard,” see Eddy, supra note 54, at 361. 
 93. Levinson, supra note 49, at 651–52. A less persuasive argument attempts to analogize 
Title VII retaliation claims to First Amendment retaliation cases, which have received broad 
treatment by the Supreme Court. Id. at 653–54. As First Amendment rights are constitutionally 
guaranteed and have a long history of protection, it seems illogical to compare the First 
Amendment decisions to retaliation, which is a statutory protection not traditionally granted the 
same deference. 
 94. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).  
 95. Id. at 346. 
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need for a broad interpretation of Title VII’s retaliation provision 
because those who engage in EEOC activity must be confident that 
the Act will protect them.”96 Just as denying a former employee 
protection under the retaliation statute would go against the goal of 
unfettered access to remedial mechanisms, requiring the employee to 
meet such a difficult test at the prima facie case stage would work 
against this goal by unduly burdening the employee’s access to the 
appropriate remedial mechanism. 
Professor Margery Corbin Eddy has analyzed the application of 
the Ellerth/Faragher liability standard to retaliation claims and also 
found the narrow rule’s application of this standard to retaliation 
claims inappropriate.97 Professor Eddy argues that the application of 
the “ultimate employment action” standard, derived from the 
application of Ellerth/Faragher to retaliation claims under the narrow 
rule, will become outcome-determinative in a way that is harmful to 
both employers and employees.98 Given that the Ellerth/Faragher 
standard calls for strict liability in discrimination cases if the 
employee shows a tangible employment action,99 the direct 
application of this standard in retaliation cases would create strict 
liability for the employer if the employee showed a tangible 
employment action as part of the prima facie case.100 As unbalanced 
as this strict liability in retaliation cases would be for employers, so 
too would the converse of this application be for employees: in the 
absence of a tangible employment action, the employee would always 
lose.101 Therefore, when the tangible employment action requirement 
is applied to retaliation cases, the standard for recovery becomes even 
narrower than that in discrimination cases, not broader as Congress 
 
 96. Levinson, supra note 49, at 652. It is also worth noting that the majority of the circuits 
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) support the use of the broad 
rule in defining adverse actions. Id. Professor Levinson highlights the EEOC’s interpretation 
that retaliation should focus on the deterrent effect that an employer’s conduct would have on 
protected activity rather than on the conduct’s effect on the employee’s employment status. Id. 
at 659. 
 97. See Eddy, supra note 54, at 377–79 (arguing that the liberal, or broad, definition is more 
desirable). 
 98. Id. at 378. 
 99. See supra Part I.C. 
 100. Eddy, supra note 54, at 378. 
 101. See Eddy, supra note 54, at 378  (noting that under the tangible employment action 
standard, “many claims recognized as viable by the Supreme Court in Burlington 
Industries/Faragher would never reach a trier of fact”).  
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intended.102 Although the dearth of Supreme Court guidance in 
retaliation cases naturally encourages courts to look to its 
discrimination cases, the resulting test under the narrow rule creates a 
standard that is both illogical and overly strict for employees when 
viewed in light of statutory intent. 
3. The Likely Impact of Suders on the Debate.  Next, although 
scholars have identified the incorrect application of the tangible 
employment action standard as a major problem with the narrow 
rule,103 their analyses preceded the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders.104 At first glance, Suders might 
seem to support a narrow-rule construction because the Court held 
that an employee must show that a constructive discharge is 
effectuated by an “official act” of the company in order to constitute 
a tangible employment action in a retaliation case.105 As explained in 
the previous section, however, applying the Ellerth/Faragher 
discrimination standard, as clarified in Suders, to retaliation cases 
would be inappropriate. Interpreted in the appropriate context, 
Suders actually offers support for the broad rule: it emphasizes that 
although employees in discrimination cases who cannot show that 
they suffered a tangible employment action would have to overcome 
the employer’s affirmative defense, they would still be able to make a 
case.106 Therefore, an employee unable to establish a tangible 
employment action could still make out a prima facie case of 
discrimination. It would be inconsistent with Court precedent and 
Congressional intent to give narrower interpretation to the retaliation 
provision than the discrimination provision, allowing discrimination 
employees, but not employees alleging retaliation, to proceed without 
showing tangible employment action.107 
 
 102. Levinson, supra note 49, at 651–52. 
 103. Id. 
 104. 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004); see supra  Part I.C for a detailed discussion of the case. 
 105. See id. at 2355 (“[W]hen an official act does not underlie the constructive discharge, the 
Ellerth and Faragher analysis, we here hold, calls for extension of the affirmative defense to the 
employer.”). 
 106. See id. at 2351 (concluding that an employer can raise an affirmative defense to a 
employee’s prima facie case if the employee does not show a tangible employment action). 
 107. Levinson, supra note 49, at 651–52. 
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B. Policy Arguments 
The policy arguments in favor of the broad rule are also 
powerful. The Supreme Court should find that the broad rule is 
preferable, especially in the reference context, for three reasons. 
First, the distribution of power between employers and employees is 
inherently unequal; second, as the EEOC has emphasized, Title VII’s 
protections will be meaningless without an effective retaliation statute 
to protect employees; and third, employers will only be deterred from 
retaliating against employees for participating in protected activity if 
employees have the power to bring retaliation claims against them. 
1. Addressing the Imbalance of Power between Employers and 
Employees.  The broad rule is the only way to redress the inherently 
unequal access to information and power that exists in the employer-
employee relationship. A reference, like any other employment 
action taken by an employer, is unilateral: the employee cannot 
control what is happening.108 In Hillig, the employee could not change 
or control what her supervisor said about her,109 and there are other 
cases in which a negative reference is given and the employee is never 
aware of it.110 Because employees are unlikely to have much 
information about either the negative references or how potential 
employers will react to them, it is disadvantageous, from a policy 
standpoint, to require employees to prove they would have gotten the 
prospective job but for the negative reference. Employers, in contrast, 
have ready access to this information, and therefore they should be 
required to produce it at the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas 
framework.111 
 
 108. Although, for example, an employee can “control” whether she is terminated by trying 
to be a good worker, ultimately the employer may choose to fire her whether or not she works 
hard. This is not meant to be an argument that employees should have a different role in the 
employment relationship or that the “at will” doctrine should be abolished. Rather, this Note 
argues that there is an inherent power disparity and that the law must respond to this in order to 
be effective. 
 109. See Hillig  v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 1030 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding that the supervisor 
made a variety of negative comments about Hillig’s work performance). 
 110. See Randy Cohen, The Way We Live Now, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2002, at 28 (discussing 
whether one friend should inform another that the latter had received a negative employer 
reference). 
 111. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (“The burden then 
must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 
employee’s rejection.”). 
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Moreover, the prima facie case is intended to be a fairly low 
bar;112 applying the broad rule maintains the integrity of this bar and 
does not create an inappropriately high hurdle for employees. As this 
Note argued in Part II, the extra “but for” causation requirement 
imposed by the narrow rule makes it nearly impossible for an 
employee to make out a prima facie case when a negative reference is 
in question. Even employees like Hillig, with a compelling story and 
clearly egregious conduct by her supervisor, would be unable to 
establish the prima facie case.113 The broad rule is necessary both 
because the information gap between employers and employees is 
wide and because it will allow employees to survive the prima facie 
case, thereby forcing employers to provide otherwise undiscoverable 
information to the court. Thus, at each stage of litigation, the broad 
rule puts the burden of production upon the party most able to satisfy 
it. 
2. Maintaining an Effective Retaliation Statute.  Given that many 
otherwise actionable claims would be rejected under the narrow 
rule,114 the broad rule is necessary to ensure that employees are 
protected by an effective retaliation provision and are not dissuaded 
from bringing Title VII claims. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Shell 
Oil indicates that the Court recognizes the importance of retaliation 
provisions and the need to interpret them broadly.115 The EEOC has 
also argued for the adoption of the broad rule, and Shell Oil states 
that the EEOC’s arguments “carry persuasive force given their 
coherence and their consistency with a primary purpose of 
antiretaliation provisions: Maintaining unfettered access to statutory 
remedial mechanisms.”116 Although Shell Oil concerned the EEOC’s 
position on the interpretation of the statutory term “employee,” the 
 
 112. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (explaining that 
the burden for the prima facie case should not be overly high). 
 113. See Hillig , 381 F.3d at 1030 (describing the extremely negative feedback given by 
Hillig’s supervisor to her prospective employer after she had made Title VII discrimination 
claims against the supervisor). 
 114. See Eddy, supra note 54, at 378 (noting that the narrow rule  would preclude many 
viable claims from ever reaching a trier of fact). 
 115. Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997). 
 116. Id. 
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agency makes the same policy arguments in favor of the broad rule 
when defining adverse employment actions.117 
Because employees are unlikely to be able to prove that they 
were not hired because of a negative reference, the possibility of a 
negative reference in retaliation is particularly damaging and very 
likely to chill employee involvement in protected activity. If 
employees thought that an employer could retaliate against them 
after engaging in protected activities and go beyond the current (and 
presumably already unhappy) employment relationship to damage a 
future one, they would be much less likely to participate in such 
activities.118 
3. Deterring Employer Retaliation.  The broad rule will deter 
illegal employer retaliation because employees will be more likely to 
be successful in establishing a prima facie case. The New York Times 
published a letter from an individual who knew (although the 
colleague did not know) that a colleague had received a negative 
reference.119 Because so many people are unaware of negative 
references that have been given about them, it is especially important 
for those individuals with knowledge of a negative reference to have a 
fair chance at making a successful prima facie case in order to deter 
employers from retaliating against employees by giving negative 
references.120 As difficult as it is to police the often hidden inner 
workings and politics of a workplace, a strong deterrent is one of the 
only ways to prevent employers from giving negative references 
motivated by retaliation. 
The Supreme Court and the EEOC have both expressed the 
concern that employers will retaliate against employees for exercising 
their rights under Title VII if there is not a sufficient legal protection 
against such retaliation. The Supreme Court acknowledged, in Shell 
Oil, the danger of allowing employers to retaliate against employees 
 
 117. See id. at 344–47 (citing the EEOC guidelines that call for a broad interpretation of 
Title VII). 
 118. Employers are likely to argue that many of these claims are frivolous and that there 
needs to be increased scrutiny of these claims, not increased access. Although this is certainly a 
valid argument, it contradicts the legal precedent and the EEOC guidelines for the 
interpretation of the statute. As explained in Part IV, infra, the overall test remains strict 
enough to weed out frivolous claims; the broad rule simply allows employees a narrow window 
to potentially make a valid claim. 
 119. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 120. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
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who engage in protected activity. There the Supreme Court cited the 
EEOC Compliance manual with approval, agreeing that an 
antiretaliation provision must be effective to prevent discrimination 
against employees who invoke protections under Title VII.121 
Applying the broad rule will not only take away the “perverse 
incentives” feared by the Supreme Court,122 it will deter more 
indefinite adverse actions, like references, that are by their very 
nature harder for employees to take action on later. 
Scholars have also identified the need for a broad rule to deter 
employer retaliation. One article points out that the narrow rule 
“practically encourages employers to retaliate against protected 
employees in numerous intangible manners which, in their totality, 
may in fact be as tangible, if not more so, than any ultimate 
employment decision.”123 Another scholar suggests that applying the 
narrow rule would allow employers to subtly punish employees in 
such ways as moving them to another department without cause 
without fear of violating antiretaliation statutes.124 Making employers 
consistently liable for giving a retaliatory negative reference will serve 
to deter bad actors and make all employers more thoughtful about 
the reference-giving process. 
*     *     * 
Legally, the narrow rule fails as it incorporates a “but for” 
requirement into the prima facie case and inappropriately applies 
Supreme Court precedent. These failings are only likely to be 
magnified if courts use Suders to further interpret these cases. The 
broad rule supports the important policy goals of deterring employers 
from retaliating against employees, upholding the protections of Title 
VII, and adjusting the imbalance of access to information and power 
that exists between employers and employees. 
IV.  PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING THE BROAD RULE: 
ACHIEVING A BALANCED OUTCOME 
When combined with the entire McDonnell Douglas framework, 
the employee-favorable broad rule results in a fair framework that 
 
 121. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. at 346. 
 122. See Essary & Friedman, supra  note 21, at 152 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 
337, 346 (1997)).  
 123. Id. 
 124. Wiles, supra note 16, at 234–35. 
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balances as best as possible the competing interests of employers and 
employees. Although Part III argued that the broad rule is preferable 
from both a legal and a policy perspective, the broad rule may 
increase employer anxiety because of its case-by-case approach and 
“fuzzy” nature.125 Employers’ anxiety over potential liability already 
makes them reluctant to provide references; although many states 
have protective legislation shielding employers from defamation suits 
resulting from references,126 some scholars have suggested that 
protective legislation has done little to assuage employer concerns.127 
An equally powerful argument against the broad rule is that 
employers typically seek early resolution of litigation, either via 
summary judgment or by settling a case with the employee, and the 
broad rule makes this resolution less likely.128 Efficiency is a worthy 
goal when paired with respect for an employee’s rights, and there is a 
loss in rejecting the narrow rule, which provides a more bright-line 
resolution.129 
The broad rule does deny the possibility of such tidy resolution, 
but when viewed within the entirety of the McDonnell Douglas 
framework, the broad rule actually balances out the system of 
burdens under which it has become increasingly difficult for 
employees to triumph. It is possible that an employee will be able to 
present a prima facie case of retaliation against an employer who had 
perfectly legitimate motives for providing a negative reference, but 
the framework then allows that employer to prove that legitimate 
 
 125. See Hyland, supra  note 21, at 292 (arguing that the broad rule opens employers to 
unnecessary liability). 
 126. For a state-by-state review of job-reference shield laws, see William C. Martucci & 
Kevin Mason, State Regulations Update, EMPLOYER REL. TODAY, Summer 2002, at 75. 
 127. See Harshman & Chachere, supra note 7, at 37 (expressing the belief that the statutes 
do not bolster employer confidence and encourage references). Professor Saxman has suggested 
a fee-shifting arrangement to discourage employees from bringing frivolous claims and to 
reduce employer anxiety about the cost of litigation. Id. (citing B. Saxman, Flaws in the Laws 
Governing Employment References: Problems of “Overdeterrence” and a Proposal for Reform, 
13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 45, 98–107 (1995)). 
 128. See John Parauda & Jathan Janove, Settle for Less: Consider the Merits of an Early 
Settlement Approach to Employment Litigation, HR MAGAZINE, Nov. 2004, at 135, 136–40 
(analyzing approaches to modern employment litigation and describing employer preference to 
settle cases). 
 129. See Cude & Steger, supra note 30, at 374 (arguing that the Fifth Circuit’s narrow rule is 
advantageous because it provides a bright-line rule). 
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motive.130 Even scholars favoring the narrow rule admit that the 
second stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework favors employers: 
“Since [the employer’s] burden [is] of production only, courts 
generally accept any nondiscriminatory reason proffered by 
employers.”131 The employee still has the opportunity to present 
evidence that the reason was pretextual; to prevail, however, the 
employee must prove both that the employer’s proffered reason is 
false and that the real reason for the employer’s action was 
discriminatory—a very high burden that is not often satisfied.132 As 
explained in Part I, the burdens of the prima facie case differ 
significantly from the employee’s ultimate burden of proof of 
causation. 
Finally, any discussion of the McDonnell Douglas framework 
must take into consideration the Court’s decision of St. Mary’s Honor 
Center v. Hicks133 and the subsequent scholarly uproar over its 
erosion of McDonnell Douglas.134 Professor Deborah Malamud calls 
for abandonment of the framework, arguing that, after Hicks, it offers 
little help to employees who lack direct evidence of discrimination.135 
Other scholars claim that the framework still retains value.136 
Regardless of what some scholars suggest, however, the McDonnell 
Douglas framework has not been jettisoned by the Supreme Court, 
and until it is, federal courts will continue to use it to analyze 
retaliation cases. 
Especially considering how difficult it is for employees to prove 
discrimination after Hicks, the broad rule does not create an overly 
employee-friendly test.137 Even if the broad rule  makes it more 
difficult for employers to obtain summary judgment at the prima facie 
 
 130. See Shea, supra note 10, at 89 (“Dealing with an employee who has engaged in 
protected activity and also has attitude or performance problems can be one of the biggest 
challenges facing even experienced, seasoned HR professionals.”).  
 131. Cude & Steger, supra note 30, at 380. 
 132. See St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506–11 (1993) (explaining that a 
employee must also prove that discrimination was the reason behind the employer’s action and 
that showing the reason was pretextual is not enough to win before a jury). 
 133. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).  
 134. See Malamud, supra  note 35, at 2236–37 (arguing that McDonnell Douglas has been so 
altered that employees would fare better under the traditional preponde rance-of-the-evidence 
standard). 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Brodin, supra note 87, at 229–39 (criticizing the move away from allowing 
circumstantial evidence and the distortion of McDonnell Douglas). 
 137. Id. 
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case stage, the overall test still remains remarkably employer friendly. 
False claims of retaliation supported by flimsy evidence will not 
survive the prima facie case stage when the broad rule is applied, and 
those employees who are unable to prove before a jury that 
retaliatory intent ultimately motivated the negative reference will not 
prevail. The broad rule offers employees a small opportunity to have 
their cases heard by a jury, whereas the narrow rule offers almost no 
opportunity. If employers are desperate to avoid a jury trial and are 
unable to get summary judgment at the prima facie case stage, they 
can settle the case with willing employees, thereby hopefully making 
more damaged employees whole. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the idea of applying a standard that has been labeled 
“broad” strikes fear into the hearts of many employers, the reality is 
that courts applying the broad rule “have done so cautiously.”138 The 
Third Circuit perhaps articulated the spirit of the broad rule best in 
stating that “[a]n employer who retaliates can not [sic] escape liability 
merely because the retaliation falls short of its intended result.”139 
Both policy and legal arguments support the universal adoption of the 
broad rule. Although the advantages of the narrow, bright-line rule 
are clear, the end result is unacceptable if Title VII is to remain a 
meaningful protection for employees. Even those employees, like 
Terrie Hillig, who were inappropriately retaliated against would be 
unable to make valid retaliation claims if the narrow rule were 
adopted. Ultimately, when the broad rule is situated within the 
potentially weakened McDonnell Douglas framework, the resulting 
test is as fair and reasonable as can be imagined within the strictures 
of the current law. 
 
 138. Eddy, supra note 54, at 377; see, e.g., Annett v. Univ. of Kan., 371 F.3d 1233, 1238–39 
(10th Cir. 2004) (applying the broad rule and finding that the employee’s failure to achieve 
Principal Investigator status was not an adverse action).  
 139. EEOC v. L.B. Foster Co., 123 F.3d 746, 754 (3d Cir. 1997).  
